Lebanon Between the Impossibility of Annexation and the Imperatives of Neutrality Prof. Khalil Hussein Head of the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy – Lebanese University Lebanon lies under immense pressure from both explicit and implicit threats, and in all cases it faces existential dangers—at times through external military incursions, and at other times through projects and proposals that fade and re-emerge depending on the interests of the parties sponsoring and supporting them. The most recent statement worth serious consideration came from the U.S. envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barack, who declared the necessity of annexing Lebanon to Syria on the basis of their shared civilizational and cultural features. This political notion has long appeared in the history of relations between the two countries, which share both similarities and divergences. Furthermore, this rhetoric has been exploited by various Lebanese and external actors alike, with clear exchanges of roles and motives behind it. Lebanon, to which four districts were annexed after being separated from Greater Syria—what later became modern Syria—continued to struggle with this addition, which Muslims did not easily accept. It is noteworthy that the Syrian National Movement played a pioneering role in 1936 in persuading Muslims to accept joining Lebanon and abandoning the project of unity with Syria. This acceptance occurred reluctantly. At the same time, Christian calls for neutrality emerged to counter both unionist and separatist projects, and such demands have frequently resurfaced in the agendas of Lebanese parties and forces at various stages of internal conflict and strife. Today, the paradox lies in the fact that if the annexation project were pursued, most Lebanese would oppose joining Syria, with only a very small minority supporting it—one too insignificant to matter politically. This is especially due to the social and political friction that emerged between Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities during the Syrian crisis, leading to alarming tensions and clashes over livelihoods and employment. Syrian presence has come to be viewed as an existential threat, particularly as the number of Syrians has surpassed the number of Lebanese citizens. Regardless of the future of the Syrian state—whether it remains unified, transforms politically or constitutionally, or fragments—the question arises: Are there any viable prospects for annexation? And what would its implications be for relations between the Lebanese and Syrian peoples, especially as mutual resentment has become fully evident since 2011, during the Syrian crisis, and throughout its consequences, including internal and external demographic transfers, and the massive regional and domestic repercussions following the fall of the Syrian regime in 2024? So far, no clear model has emerged for the nature of the future Syrian system. Will Syria remain a unified state? Will it move toward a confederal system? Or will it break into separate entities with no real ties among them? In such a context, how would Lebanese regions be annexed, and what new political entities would emerge? What prospects exist for the social cohesion necessary for such projects? Tom Brock’s remarks may reflect earlier proposals for redrawing the political map of the Middle East. Today’s circumstances might indeed seem favorable to such endeavors, after the Syrian earthquake reshaped power dynamics across the region and sidelined forces that once formed a regional axis but quickly collapsed amid the Israeli war on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. There is no doubt that forced annexation would cause profound political and social fractures with the potential to ignite conflict. Both internal and external factors would fuel this new reality, generating sectarian and ethnic strife in which many actors have vested interests. This calls for greater awareness in managing objections and searching for less costly alternatives for what lies ahead. Lebanese neutrality may provide a viable path to avoid escalating conflicts that would further complicate matters. In fact, recent political shifts in Lebanon reveal that broad segments of society no longer oppose neutrality—even among those who once rejected it. Thus, a key part of the solution exists, provided the other conditions necessary for establishing neutrality are met. In principle, a neutrality policy requires three fundamental conditions for successful implementation: 1. Acceptance by the Lebanese people, which appears increasingly present after years of suffering caused by foreign interventions. 2. The Lebanese ability to defend their neutrality themselves. 3. Approval of influential regional and international powers that play significant roles in Lebanese affairs. Of course, ensuring and protecting neutrality is not easy in the face of powerful regional actors—such as Israel, Iran, Turkey, and several Arab states—let alone global powers such as the United States, Russia, and France. Thus, there is a pressing need to reach an international agreement through a global conference to guarantee and protect Lebanese neutrality. There are many obstacles to the proposed annexation project, and significant challenges also face the pursuit of neutrality. However, international experiences show that neutrality can succeed when the will exists, as seen in Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Poland, Finland, and the three Benelux countries—all of which adopted neutrality under circumstances sometimes similar, sometimes different. Yet this choice ultimately allowed their peoples and political systems to live in peace. Today, the Middle East is undergoing a painful and turbulent transformation filled with wars and conflicts over various issues—most prominently the struggle over economic resources such as oil and gas—often wrapped in religious, sectarian, and ethnic narratives. Will Lebanon escape the scenarios proposed for it, or will it enter a new tunnel of internal and external conflict that could end its existence once and for all? War drums are beating, and dark clouds now blanket the entire region.