10‏/02‏/2008

Energy and Security in Persian Gulf

Energy and Security in Persian Gulf
The 15th International Conference on General Asia
And the Caucasus

"Expansion of NATO to Eurasia :Dimension & consequences"

Tahran 29 -30 October 2007
By: Dr. Khalil Hussein
Professor of international public law
at Lebanese university
Director of legal studies at Lebanese Parliament
First: energy and security, a continual history
The term "energy security" involves a large number of issues, many of the various energy sources. Deposit sources of electric heating and lighting, transport, industry, and without securing petroleum products for transportation, and energy security remains for the majority of industrialized countries, synonymous with secure access to foreign oil supplies at reasonable prices. According to most of the industrial country," safety power" continues to be a synonym for providing possible prices for petroleum supplies. Hence, all the consumers and providers care for everything that could endanger the safety of petrol and care for the possibility to deliver it to the markets.
It has become concern for the security of oil supplies key element in strategic planning since the First World War. The United Kingdom was among the first major powers that have suffered from sensitive access to oil in times of war, especially after paying decision Lord Winston Churchill-before the First World War-the transition from coal to oil to supply the Royal British warships, for possession of the rules and sources of oil capable of providing the British fleet. The United Kingdom did not possess domestic sources of oil unlike the United States. With the outbreak of the war, Britain tried to control new sources of oil. The failure did not affect the British access to the local needs of oil continued its military operations until February 1917, to Germany resumed its campaign in the war in submarines, which led to paralysis of the Royal Navy shortage of oil, which left a profound impact on military planners have them focus on how to avoid it in the future

We have access to such an important part in oil strategy axis and the Allies during the Second World War. The Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) were suffer shortage of fuel supplies. This was the case for Germany and Japan. The Charter guarantee the Nazi-Soviet in 1939 many of the items secret for oil and the Middle East, which impact on the military strategy in the early days of the war. For example, the Soviet Union was promised to be left him freedom in the Persian Gulf if the Allies defeated Germany, while Stalin's decision to supply Germany farm Caucasus blow to the allies pushed Britain and France to attack oil facilities in the Soviet Caucasus Rules French in Syria. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 - in part trying to reach Ukraine rich sources, and to protect the vital supplies from Romania. The German strategy in 1941 – 1942 was based on access to Stalingrad, at the same time, move to the Caucasus, which contains three major oilfields in Maycob, Groznyy, and Baku, in addition to the oil pipelines in the Caucasus. One of the motives of the resolution within the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor in December 17, 1941 effective ban American oil in the summer of 1941, and the need for Japan to secure oil resources of Indonesia.
The United States was able to supply the Allies huge operations in the Second World War. The burden of the American military professionals made them pessimistic about the ability of America to make any other conflict fueling long-term, with the assumption that a war with the Soviet Union could last three or four years, will be settled in a few nuclear weapons in the American arsenal, and that the United States does not have enough oil reserves to enter a war that could last more than a year or two. Thus, a strong emphasis in military plans on the West need to secure oil fields in the Middle East early in any future conflict.
In contrast to the United States, Europe cannot rely on domestic supply to meet the growing demand in time of peace. The energy crisis after World War II increased from the European dependence on Middle East oil. To a remarkable degree, the cold winters and energy crisis in the United States led to reassess its role leading the world in the wake of victory and the end of hostilities in February 1947. This role has emerged in the United States decision on replacing the United Kingdom as protector of Greece and Turkey, in the rebuilding of Europe (Marshall project, which was announced in June 1947). One of the implications of the draft Marshall is the further transmission of Europe from coal to oil major fuel for industry and power generation. This meant greater reliance on Gulf oil, especially after the emergence of abundant supplies there. Then, the current boom began in the Middle East oil, after the region has seen a rapid expansion in the fields and distribution systems, including the new pipelines to the Mediterranean.
During the 1950s, the attempts to control the oil and distributing it hurried the occurrence of two crises in the Middle East. The first crisis was in 1951 when the government nationalized the Iranian oil company Anglo-Iranian joint. While the second occurred in 1956 when Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in reaction to the decision taken by the United States and Britain to cancel World Bank loan to help Egypt in the construction of the High Dam in Aswan. The United Kingdom launched a war against France and Egypt-in-part, to secure control of the supply of oil from the Gulf to Europe via the Suez Canal.
The issue of energy security dimensions of the strategy after the Arab oil embargo in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and for several reasons:
First, the appearance of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC as a strong balance in the face of industrialized democracies, which raised controversy about the redistribution of the international force after it became of Petroleum Exporting Countries-in fact-owners of the banks in the world.
Second, growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union, and growing concerns about the possibility of Moscow and its allies to become in the crisis-future-in a position to cut the supply of vital raw materials from the Middle East and Africa. This has led to the development of western military strategies budget to protect oil supplies, especially from the Persian Gulf, and to defend the sea-lanes.
Third is the emergence of the environmental movement and the emergence of influential literary expect growth boundaries, and defends the values for the prevention of economic expansion, which led to the success of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD.
However, the pessimistic scenarios that prevailed in the 1970s, did not materialize for several important reasons. However, the oil market was saturated because of the decline in demand Arab and economic stagnation, and the emergence of new sources of oil.
In the mid-1990s, there were some forecasts energy crisis with the other end of the century due-to a certain extent - growth Asian economies, and the growing needs for energy, particularly in China and India. While the core problem in the face of the Asian energy needs is a challenge future, emerged in late 1997, the problem of energy security again, but this time because of the Asian financial crisis.
Second: the dilemmas of contemporary security
Fears focus on energy security is more on the stability of oil prices, and less on the possibility of global confrontation between the major powers... If supplies fell from a particular region, such as the Gulf will increase prices in the short term until the market balanced. From the economic standpoint, it does not matter to North America and Western Europe imported 20% and 29%, respectively, of foreign oil needs from the Gulf, while Asia imports 74%, since the three regions will be affected equally if dropped supplies from the Gulf or anywhere else , threatened or if the means of delivery of such supplies.
This could be reduced or sudden rise in oil prices has serious consequences for consumers or producers. For a strong industrial, will mean high prices in the short term result, the demand for petroleum products in the industrialized countries is high, relative decline in demand because it is difficult to find alternatives to petroleum products, and the rise of commodity prices linked to oil daily. For those of democracy, will be oil price raises important political repercussions. Body electorates in the United States are very sensitive to the issue of oil prices. During the presidential campaign in the United States in 1996, a modest increase in the price of gasoline American Republican candidate Bob Dole was paid to say that the energy crisis is serious. Despite the obvious exaggeration, but the suspension States indicates that the memory of America still remember the effects of high oil prices in the 1970s, four times.
In the long range, it is expected that the rise in oil prices lead to a reduction in demand, and thus the price collapse, which owns industrial powers effective mechanisms of adaptation - with the time - with the high oil prices across the economy and invention and taxes. In addition, it could help the petroleum partnership agreements made by the International Energy Agency IEA in 1974, and the United States to maintain a strategic reserve of oil can be resorted to, the lower the price of oil in the global market. However, it should be noted that many of those that did not participate in the agreements and the International Energy Agency, or did not follow the plan as a conscious West, may be exposed to devastating effects in the case of the rapid rise in oil prices. The pay rise of oil prices in 1990-1991 India to the brink of bankruptcy is forced to make radical reforms in the State. Many emerging economies today, is facing a similar position to the position of India in the early 1990s. The impact of good exporters from the low price is that it encourages consumption and therefore greater reliance on the security Gulf oil cheap. In the distant range, low price might lead to a retreat from efforts to maintain strong industrial oil, and to develop alternatives to petroleum economy. The negative effects, is that low prices directly affect the returns, and therefore the budgets of the Gulf States oil producing thereby causing serious political problems
As low returns also limit the size of domestic capital that could be invested in major oil producers' infrastructure of new oil. As a result, the growing pressure, on the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC, and Iran, to amend their national policies that does not encourage foreign investment in the oil sector.
This was evident when he called the then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in September 1998 - which has seen national Arab-West to invest in the infrastructure of oil in Saudi Arabia.

Third: the growing demand for Gulf oil
The demand on energy will increase, in 2020, three times more than it was in the 1970s, and this growing demand will be saturated by oil, natural gas, and coal. The energy needs of the newly industrialized nations will increase to double by 2010. It is expected that the global demand for oil will increase from 71.6 million barrels a day in 1997 to more than 115 million barrels a day by 2020. In 1995, the States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD consumed about two thirds of world oil supplies. In the next two decades, it is expected to consume about one third of these countries the increase in demand only.
That could change several unforeseen developments from the projections of energy demand, most notably: global economic recession, changing tax and subsidy policies in the major energy-consuming result of environmental concerns and other radical development in energy technologies to make them more efficient and less costly. With these developments in mind can be expected tracks in fifteen or twenty years ahead.
On one hand, there is enough oil in the world to meet global demand in the distant future. The problem lies in extracting oil from the ground, and ensures the distribution in the market at an acceptable price. In the face of access to oil, there are political and economic obstacles and regulatory obstacles than geological. In addition, it should be noted that at a time of increasing reserves of oil and natural gas and coal in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin, these regions are preparing one of the most volatile regions in the world. Since the Gulf alone contains more than 64% of the worlds confirmed oil reserves, and is seen as able to meet the escalating demand for energy by the industrial countries. Therefore, the Gulf will remain a vital source of oil, and could become the Caspian basin another important source of oil and gas.
Fourth: the association Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf region will be essential interest of the foreign policy of the United States because it is over-largest reservoir of oil extracted. "Bb Amoco" says, the major producers in the Gulf have about 675 billion barrels of oil, or nearly two thirds of known global reserves. The Gulf is the first in the world production level has secured combined daily approximately 21 million barrels per day in 1999, a rate of about 30% of world production. Because the Gulf believes such a large share of production, the state decides the price usually sold.
Although the United States received only 18% of its oil import from the Persian Gulf, it has great strategic interest in the stability of energy production Gulf because major allies - especially Japan and West African States-depend on the region's imports. The large size of Gulf oil exports will contribute to the maintenance of world oil prices relatively low, and this is reflected on the benefits of the American economy based on oil. Then, because domestic production to decline, the United States will become more dependent on exports of the Gulf. As a result, the energy plan declares, "this region will be vital to the interests of the United States."
There is no doubt that the United States played a prominent role in the affairs of the Persian Gulf since the Second World War. With the end of that war, a President Franklin Roosevelt signed an agreement with the King of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz bin Saudi in which the United States agreed to protect the royal family from internal and external enemies in return for access to the privileges of access to Saudi oil. Later, the United States agreed to provide security assistance to the Shah of Iran and the leaders of Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. These agreements lead to transfer huge amounts of weapons and ammunition to the American Gulf states, and sometimes to the deployment of American forces there.
The American policy to protect the energy production from the Gulf were unambiguous: when there is a threat the United States is using all necessary means, including military forces to ensure the continued flow of oil. The President Jimmy Carter was the first who explained this principle in January 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the shah. The policy of the United States continues to use force in many events consistent with the "principle Carter": First in 1987-88 to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from rocket attacks and boats Iranian during the Iran-Iraq war. Then in 1990-1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Today the "principle of Carter" is still vital as in the past. Between 1991 and 2001,the Ministry of Defense expand its capabilities essential for the American military in the Gulf, including published air and naval forces in the region and additional re storage of weapons and ammunition to ground troops are enormous. All these capabilities established in the autumn of 2001 through the work the American attack on "Al Qaeda" fighters and the Taliban in Afghanistan and processes relevant to the Gulf Region (with the fact that Saudi Arabia imposed some restrictions on the use of American air bases on their territory). The United States continued to sell sophisticated weapons worth billions of dollars from friendly regimes in the region, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. To ensure greater protection of the flow of oil from the risk of any disruption, the United States of America occupy Iraq.
Policy makers Americans are facing two serious challenges in the future: to ensure greater producer Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil production to the extent consistent with the growing demand of American (and world), and protect Saudi itself from internal disturbance.
There is an urgent need to increase production, especially in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia possesses a quarter of known oil reserve in the world (and appreciation 265 billion barrels) and it is the only state who is able to meet American demand and global. The Ministry of American energy production says that the Saudi oil must double, in the next twenty years, from 11.4 million to 23.1 million barrels a day, to meet the expected global needs. However, the increased production of 11.7 million barrels per day - the equivalent of the current total production to the United States and Canada - would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, there will be technical, and logistical challenges are immense. Analysts believe that the best way to achieve the necessary increase is to persuade Saudi Arabia to open its oil sector to the huge investments of the American oil companies. Under the energy plan by the American administration, this is what entirely by the President. Nevertheless, any American effort to exert pressure on Riyadh to allow the largest American oil investments in the Kingdom is expected to give a great deal of resistance from the royal family, which nationalized American oil companies in the 1970s.
The administration faced another problem in Saudi Arabia is that the American security relationship with the long-range system has become a major source of tension in the kingdom with increasing numbers of young Saudis who overthrow the United States because of their links to document Israel and bias against Islam. It is this hostile atmosphere to the United States managed to Osama bin Laden's organization of a large number of his followers late 1990s and obtained financial support. After September 11, the Saudi government has taken stringent measures against some of these forces, but popular opposition to the military cooperation and economic system (Saudi) with Washington remains strong. Therefore, one of the most difficult challenges facing policy Americans makers in the coming years is to find a way to dispel the opposition with persuade Riyadh to increase its oil shipments to the United States.
Fifth: Conclusions
The Security of Persian Gulf will remain a strategic challenge of the global economy. The rely on the oil will increase in the coming decades. The growing needs of the Asian Petroleum Gulf coincide with the retreat of international support for American policy in the region, and with the emergence of the Caspian basin region of geopolitical competition on energy transit corridors. Any major military confrontation could affect in the Gulf heavily on the natural security of oil supply, and therefore the high world prices for oil, where the decline in oil prices is is one of the most dangerous sources of instability in the world today. The Saudi Arabia and Iran States most affected by this.
Based on these data, the continuation of the Iraqi crisis and the American stance from Iran to fuel is increasing the instability in the region. In addition, the US military occupation will cause political chaos in the Islamic world. Over time, the emergence of Asian countries as consumers' key Gulf oil will reduce from the scope of the unilateral American action, especially if there was a lack of substantive agreement between the United States and Asia and the Gulf countries on major potential use of force.
There is a clear link between security in the Persian Gulf and the oil and its exportation; therefore, the interest of all countries in the region should be to look for realistic solutions and practical reservation pillars together, and security and securing oil export isolation from external interference. In fact, this could not be done so except through its country. This is the realistic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that speaks of creating good relations in the Gulf by extending political and economic bridges. Practically this is done through the evident openness during the visit of President Ahmadinejad to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in an attempt to search for common frameworks to avoid the American schemes targeting all countries of the region and its bounty without exception.
In fact, oil security in the region requires subjective conditions of the Gulf States, first and foremost. These subjective conditions stem from the need for awareness of Arab States to the American occupation of Iraq and its presence in some countries in the region, and the removal of these issues, which portends very significant negative repercussions not only on oil but on the whole, economy, peace and security, on both regional and international levels.